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ABSTRACT

Day, Nicholas Tyler, M.S., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2008.
Item and Person Characteristics as Predictors of Faking.

Applicants may be more motivated to fake than incumbents and may fake more
on some items than others. The present study investigated both item and person
characteristics as predictors of faking. At the item level, both item transparency and jobrelevance were hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of faking. In contrast,
item verifiability was hypothesized to be associated with lower levels of faking. At the
person level, applicants were expected to have a higher prevalence of faking than
incumbents. Data was taken from an existing pool of applicants (n = 507) and incumbents
(n = 302) at a customer calling center. The study was performed using a multilevellogistic regression (MLR) approach to estimating person response curve (PRC) for results
for Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Openness items. None of the item-level results
were significant for Conscientiousness, but the analyses found significant item-level
effects for Extraversion and Openness. First, item transparency was related to higher
levels of faking. Also, individuals were more likely to fake for items of low verifiability
than items of high verifiability. Unexpectedly, individuals were more likely to fake for
items of low job-relevance than items of high job-relevance. The results for person-level
effects showed that applicants exhibited substantial model fit over incumbents, although
incumbents appeared to have higher levels of faking than incumbents. The results and
implications are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
During the application process, many applicants are likely to exaggerate or distort
their personal attributes (e.g., Heron, 1956; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Rosse et al., 1998).
For instance, applicants may make themselves appear more dependable or energetic than
they are in reality. Perhaps the easiest way for applicants to “fake good” is on their
responses to personality scales. Applicant faking has become a major concern for
personnel psychologists. This type of strategic faking in applicants may yield inaccurate
test scores, which can compromise the use of test results in a selection context (e.g.,
Dunnette et al., 1962; Holden & Jackson, 1981; Pannone, 1984). Hough et al.’s (1990)
review found no overall difference in criterion-related validities for faking and nonfaking
applicants; however, other studies have shown that faking may affect the rank ordering of
applicants (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Christiansen et al., 1994; Rosse et al., 1998).
Although there are numerous studies on the outcomes of faking, not many researchers
have examined factors that may contribute to faking (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Robie,
2006). I am not aware of research that simultaneously models the effects of both test item
features and contextual factors on applicants faking on personality tests. It may be that
certain test items lead to higher levels of faking than others, and that some applicants may
fake to a larger extent than others.
In the present study, I investigated three item features: item verifiability, item
transparency, and item job-relevance. I hypothesize that items that are less verifiable
more transparent, and more job relevant will be associated with higher levels of faking. In
1

addition, I suggest that applicants will fake more and score higher than incumbents.
Because these variables are on two levels of analysis, I used the multilevel logistic
regression (MLR) person response curve (PRC) framework outlined by LaHuis and
Copeland (in press). MLR uses estimates from the two-parameter logistic (2PL) itemresponse theory (IRT) or graded response model. I examined faking on each factor of the
Big Five: Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and
Openness.
In the following sections, I will briefly review the 2PL model. This model is
based on a dichotomous type of response pattern, where individuals answer either
positively (“endorsed”) or negatively (“nonendorsed”). Next I will describe the MLR
approach to estimating PRC’s (Reise, 2000) and how it can be used to test hypotheses
related to applicant faking. For tests with polytomous items, I will explain using an
extension of the 2PL model called the graded response model (GRM), which has been
developed by Samejima (1969; 1996). Finally, I will describe the theoretical rationale for
my hypotheses regarding faking.
Two-Parameter Logistic Model
IRT has many applications for studying test behavior (Baker, 2001; Embretson &
Reise, 2000). In particular, the standard 2PL model has proven useful for analyzing
personality/dichotomous data (Reise & Waller, 1990; Waller & Reise, 1989).
The equation for the 2PL model is:
P ij (Y=1|θ j ) =

exp[α i (θ j − β i )]
1 + exp[α i (θ j − β i )]

(1)

The 2PL model specifies the probability of endorsing item i for person j as a function of a
person’s trait level (θ j ), an item’s discrimination (α i ), and an item’s difficulty (β i ). This
2

equation can be used to plot item response curves (IRC’s), which demonstrate the
functioning of an individual item (see Figure 1). Trait levels (θ) are assumed to have a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and item difficulty (β) is placed onto the same
metric as θ.
The item discrimination parameter (α i ) are the slope of the IRC’s, which
represents the ability of the item to discriminate accurately between high and low trait
levels. As seen by Figure 1, the dotted item has higher discrimination than items 1 or 3.
Items with high discriminations have steeper slopes, and there is a clearer division
between high and low trait levels. Item discriminations typically range usually from 0.75
to 1.75.
The IRCs’ locations are determined by item difficulty (i.e., item threshold). In
Figure 1, the first and second items both have a difficulty of zero, because average trait
level on the X-axis corresponds to a 0.5 probability of endorsement on the Y-axis. In
other words, respondents are 50% likely to endorse an item where their trait level
matches item difficulty. Probability changes from 50% as trait level is estimated to be
greater or less than the item’s difficulty. This change in probability levels out, as
individuals’ trait levels get farther away from the item’s difficulty. As can be seen by
Figure 1, the dashed IRC has an item difficulty of 1.0 and appears further the right,
because a 0.5 probability corresponds to a higher theta value. An Item Response Curve
with lesser item difficulty would appear shifted to the left of the center theta value.
In general, items are modeled to represent different degrees of the latent trait
being measured. The most difficult items can be useful for isolating individuals at top
trait levels, whereas other items may be useful for partitioning individuals at a low-to-
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moderate standing on the trait. In this way, item difficulty can be thought as the item’s
location threshold for estimating trait level.
Item and Person Fit
Item fit is assessed by comparing the model-implied responses with observed
responses, using available statistical indices (e.g., a chi-square test). Chernyshenko et al.
(2001) describe a procedure for computing 2PL model fit using chi-squares adjusted for
sample sizes.
If item fit is adequate, person fit may also be examined. That is, item parameters
and trait levels can be used to verify the probability of individual response patterns.
Person fit can be assessed using the slopes of person response curves (PRC’s). A PRC
describes the relationship of how the probability of item endorsement decreases as item
difficulty increases. The equation for graphing a PRC is:
P ij (Y=1|β i ) =

exp[α i (θ j − β i )]
1 + exp[α i (θ j − β i )]

(2)

The 2PL model predicts that individuals are unlikely to endorse items with much
higher difficulty levels than their estimated trait level. Thus, person fit is evaluated by
examining the negative slope of the PRC’s for responses to items of increasing difficulty.
A strong negative slope would indicate excellent person fit – because the probability of
endorsement decreases markedly as item difficulty increases (see Figure 2; Honest
curve). A less negative slope would indicate a lack of person fit – because examinees are
answering questions of higher quality than should be expected by their trait levels (see
Figure 2; Faking curve). Poor fit indicates that examinees have a relative lack of
correspondence between their trait levels and response patterns. In selection settings, lack
of person fit can most likely be attributed to faking on certain items.
4

MLR and Person Fit
The MLR approach is one way to assess person fit by comparing the slopes of
PRC’s. Reise (2000) developed the MLR approach for indices of person fit under a
dichotomous 2PL IRT model, but the same approach can also be used for polytomous
items (LaHuis & Copeland, in press). The basic approach treats item difficulty as a Level
1 predictor and person trait levels as a Level 2 predictor, which is represented by the
following set of equations:
P ij (Y=1| X ij ) =

exp(b 0j + b1jβ ij )
1 + exp(b 0j + b1jβ ij )

b 0j = γ 00 + γ 01 (θ j ) + u 0j
b 1j = γ 10 + u 1j

(3)
(4)
(5)

In Equations 3-5: b 0j represents the intercept for person j, and b 1j represents
person j’s slope coefficient. These equations produce PRC’s like those in Figure 2. More
negative b 1j ’s indicate better fit. The γ’s represent Level 2 coefficients, and the u’s are the
unique deviations for person j for the intercept and slope. The b 0j intercept coefficient
represents the expected probability when all predictors are zero. The b 1j slope coefficient
represents the shared prediction of scores. β ij is the level of difficulty for item i, and θ j is
the trait level of person j.
Using this framework, MLR may be used to identify systematic variance in
PRC’s by testing for significant variance in the slopes for item difficulty. LaHuis and
Copeland (in press) suggest that individual differences in faking may be a cause of
systematic differences in PRC slopes. For example, a faker might endorse many of the
toughest items, but overlook other items that are not as difficult. This would result in
poor person fit to the 2PL model.
5

One of the benefits of MLR is the ability to test a priori hypotheses concerning
how item and person characteristics relate to faking, such as variance related to item
features and job level. MLR treats item-level data as nested within the individuals. In this
way, item features are specified as Level 1 variables, while individual level variables are
specified as Level 2 variables.
Polytomous Data
The graded-response model (GRM; Samejima, 1969; 1996) is an extension of the
2PL model for data that is designed for polytomous responses. Most personality tests are
scaled on more than two possible answers. The advantage for designing tests with
polytomous items is that responses have greater range and flexibility of scoring, thus
helping to diminish error and increase precision (Spector, 1992).
Samejima’s GRM assumes an item has m ordered categories, in order to allow the
estimation of item parameters at each category. IRT estimation is done for (k = m - 1)
categories – which define the boundary response functions (BRF’s). BRF’s are the
probability of endorsing upper response options versus the probability of endorsing lower
response options. For example, the BRF (P* i3 ) is the probability of choosing response
option 3 or above. The BRF (P* i4 ) is the chance of choosing response option 4 or above.
On a 6-choice response item, the BRF (P* i6 ) would involve the probability of choosing
the highest option. The equation for a BRF is:
P* ik (Y=1|θ j ) =

exp[α i (θ j − β ik )]
1 + exp[α i (θ j − β ik )]

(6)

This equation substitutes the probability of choosing between categories in the
BRF, instead of the probability of choosing between responses in the dichotomous model
(see Equation 1). The BRF equation has parameters equivalent to the standard 2PL model
6

– except for β ik , the threshold parameter, which represents item difficulty for response
option k. For a 6-choice response item, there are 5 possible β ik parameters. The item
discrimination value (α i ) is held constant. Figure 3 shows an example of consecutive
BRF’s for a 6-choice response item.
BRF’s can be used to calculate the probability of endorsing a single response
option. See the following equations for calculating the probability of selecting each
individual response option:

Pi1 (θ) = 1 − Pi2* (θ)

(7)

Pi2 (θ) = Pi2* (θ) − Pi3* (θ)

(8)

Pi3 (θ) = Pi3* (θ) − Pi4* (θ)

(9)

Pi4 (θ) = Pi4* (θ) − Pi5* (θ)

(10)

Pi5 (θ) = Pi5* (θ) − Pi6* (θ)

(11)

Pi6 (θ) = Pi6* (θ) − 0

(12)

These equations show that the probabilities of selecting a particular option (P ik ),
given theta, are calculated cumulatively by subtracting one BRF from the previous BRF.
It is possible to conduct a MLR analysis on only the BRF’s that are theoretically useful.
As shown in Equation 3, the GRM can be thought of as a series of dichotomous 2PL
models. For this study of faking, it is likely that applicant faking is most prevalent for the
probability of choosing the highest response option versus lower options (BRF = P* i6 ).
In the following sections, I develop several hypotheses about how item and
person characteristics relate to faking. Specifically, at the item level, I propose that item
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transparency, job-relevance, and verifiability may influence faking. At the person level, I
suggest that applicants exhibit higher levels of faking than incumbents.
Item-Level Characteristics
Item Verifiability
Verifiable items are likely to discourage faking on questionnaires, by asking for
responses where the examinee could be held accountable for lying. Mael (1991) states
that, “A verifiable item is an item that can be corroborated from an independent source”
(p. 777). For example, applicants may be less likely to fake on biographical questionnaire
items if they are verifiable from other records of employment (Asher, 1972). A verifiable
test item might ask for something that is commensurable with employment records, such
as punctuality.
Compared to most forms of selection, personality inventories are often less
verifiable in nature. This is because personality items tap into subjective internal states,
behavioral intents, and hypothetical responses (Asher, 1972; Hough et al., 1990; Mael,
1991). However, people do tend to respond in ways that are consistent with the
impression they think that others have of them, albeit positive or negative (Schlenker,
1980, Schlenker et al., 2008). Fakers may have a high degree of discomfort with items
that are even somewhat verifiable, so they would be motivated to give an honest
response. Cognitive dissonance theory asserts that people in uncertain circumstances are
motivated to give responses that are aligned with the perceived impressions of others
(Festinger, 1957). Thus, personality items should be less fakable if they are related to
outward behaviors that could be observed by others, rather than internal states of
disposition (Mael, 1991).

8

Some research has focused on item verifiability and the prevalence of faking.
Donovan et al. (2003) found that the applicants’ perceptions of verifiability was
correlated negatively (r = -.67) with their prevalence of faking on noncognitive measures,
though this effect was overshadowed by perceived severity of the deception. In another
study of item features, verifiable items exhibited less susceptibility to distortion than
nonverifiable items (Mael, 1991). Also, Becker & Colquitt (1992) found verifiability was
related to less distortion as compared to other item features on a biodata form. More
research is needed in this area. Based on this, I predict the verifiability of the item will be
negatively related to faking.
Hypothesis 1: Easily verifiable items will permit less faking than those that are more
difficult to verify, after controlling for item difficulty and trait level. Thus, verifiability
will be negatively related to the probability of endorsement.
Item Transparency
With transparent items, applicants can easily guess the response that would
produce a higher score on the personality construct (Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell,
1995). This characteristic makes transparent items amenable to faking. Non-transparent
items tend to be abstruse or idiosyncratic, while still tapping into the target construct
(Jackson, 1971). However, non-transparent items also tend to be less valid or
theoretically based (Duff, 1965; Wiener, 1948). This helps explain why transparent items
are more prevalent in personality inventories (e.g., Abrahams et al., 1971).
Boyle & Start (1989) lamented that self-report tests typically include a large
number of transparent items, which are clearly relevant to the construct, and therefore
easy to fake. Non-transparent items might decrease the ability to fake, because there may
be no obvious response that would provide a “correct” score on the construct being
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measured (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Much of the research on transparency has focused
on the utility of “subtle scales” that have been developed in order to curb faking (e.g.,
Hough & Paulin, 1994; Barge & Hough, 1986; Owens, 1976). This approach to test
construction has had mixed success, as many of these scales have been found vulnerable
to faking (e.g., Meehl & Hathaway, 1946; Schrader & Osburn, 1977; Thornton &
Gierasch, 1980). While it may be difficult to ascertain the construct underlying nontransparent items, it is often still possible to guess the correct direction to make a desired
response (Snell et al., 1999). Unfortunately, very few of these studies have focused at the
item level.
Although Zickar & Drasgow (1996) proposed that an item transparency would be
an important feature of fakable tests, this has not been examined directly. In the present
study, I tested relationships between item transparency and faking using the MLR
approach. I expect that item transparency will adversely affect the honesty of
respondents.
Hypothesis 2: Item transparency will be positively related to faking, after controlling for
item difficulty and trait level. Thus, transparency will be positively related to the
probability of endorsement.
Item Job-Relevance
Another item-level predictor of faking may be item job relatedness (Leary &
Kowalski, 1990). Kroger & Turnbull (1975) found that individuals faked more
successfully on personality tests when made aware of the accurate job description.
Similarly, Kluger et al. (1991) discovered that graduate students scored marginally higher
on biodata if provided with a specific job title, than if asked more generally to simulate
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“applying for a job.” Personality inventories may be most successful for those applicants
who are able to target which items are specifically job related.
Without adequate job knowledge, applicants may actually fake in the wrong
direction on some jobs, because their conceptions might include negative or inaccurate
stereotypes (Mahar et al., 1995). In one meta-analysis, applicants for a sales job appeared
to actually fake in the wrong direction on a scale of agreeableness (Birkeland et al.,
2006). Other jobs, such as junior manager, may be particularly easy for applicants to
guess the ideal job-relevant characteristics (Martin et al., 2002).
The choice of which items to fake is primarily a matter of personal judgment
(Furnham, 1990). Kreitler & Kreitler (1981) found that a sample of Israeli military had
extreme responses most related to judgments of relevance for items of a personality scale.
Also, this study found that test takers were likely to respond neutrally for items of
questionable relevance. I suggest job applicants may tend to give neutral responses and
fake less on items that are not job-relevant, while they tend to give more extreme
responses to questions judged highly relevant.
Hypothesis 3: Item job-relevance will be positively related to faking controlling for item
difficulty and trait level. Thus, job-relevance will be positively related to the probability
of endorsement.
Individual-Level Characteristics
At the individual level, applicants tend to score higher than incumbents do on
personality scales, with no observed differences between groups other than the possibility
of faking (Birkeland et al., 2006). For instance, Schmit & Ryan (1993) compared the
factor structure of the Big Five for applicant and incumbent job groups. The applicant
group had a different response pattern than the incumbent group for four of the five
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NEO-FFI subscales. That is, applicants uniformly endorsed a category of items regardless
of their underlying trait level. Schmit & Ryan suggested that this category of responses
was best described by an “ideal employee factor” – which resembles faking.
Robie et al. (2001) conducted a large study comparing applicant sales managers
and incumbent sales managers. In support of the faking hypothesis, they found that
applicants scored approximately 0.5 standard deviations higher than incumbents on
personality scales measuring the Big Five. These results were compared with the
laboratory study by Zickar and Robie (1999) who found similar differences in test scores
between faking and honest groups and explained that, “…some items were more easily
faked than others” (p. 559). Robie et al. (2001) were unable to pinpoint the same itemrelated causes of faking.
The use of a between-subjects design has been criticized somewhat in the faking
literature (e.g., Ellingson et al., 2006; Hogan et al., 2007). Zickar et al. (2004) found
substantial variation in distortion for both applicants and incumbents, which
compromised the ability to compare groups directly. Incumbents may engage in selfpresentation bias in much the same way as applicants. Therefore, a broad comparison in
test scores between applicants and incumbents may overlook actual patterns of distortion
that occurs in both groups. This is why it is important to treat faking as a continuous
variable and to investigate applicant-incumbent differences in conjunction with
interactions at the test level (Ellingson et al., 2006).
Differences in mean test scores between applicants and incumbents have been
most recently demonstrated by Birkland et al.’s meta-analysis (2006). The results of this
meta-analysis were similar to results of another meta-analysis (Viswesvaran & Ones,
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1999) which compared groups of “fake good” or “honest” respondents. According to
Birkeland et al., “The degree to which [applicants] distort their scores, however, is (a)
less than the degree that they distort scores when instructed to fake and (b) depends on
the personality dimension being measured, the type of job, and the type of test” (p. 325).
Several studies have found either measurement invariance or a similar factor structure
between applicants and incumbents on tests of personality (e.g., Griffin et al., 2004;
Robie et al., 2001; Tsaousis & Nikolaou, 2001). However, research agrees that applicants
tend to score higher than incumbents on impression management scales (e.g., Dunnette et
al., 1962; Rosse et al., 1998). In general, Birkeland et al. (2006) found that job applicants
scored higher than incumbents on the Big Five traits of Conscientiousness (d = 0.45) and
Emotional Stability (d = 0.43).
Thus, there is some indication that applicants fake more than incumbents do.
However, this effect has not been examined using the MLR approach. That is, it not clear
if there are applicant and incumbent differences in PRC’s. Based on previous research, I
would expect that applicants will be more likely to have PRC’s that are consistent with
faking. That is, I suggest that the slopes of the PRC’s will be less negative than those for
incumbents.
Hypothesis 4: The slopes of the PRC’s will be less negative for applicants than those for
incumbents.
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Method
Participants
Archival data was collected by a personality testing center. Participants were 507
applicants for and 302 incumbents in customer call service positions. Demographic data
were unavailable.
Twelve graduate students volunteered to rate items of the Work Style 5 in terms
of verifiability, transparency, and job-relevance. Students rated each item on a series of
scales, using a written key for each scale (Appendix A). Their answers were averaged to
provide ratings for verifiability, transparency, and job-relevance of each item. A similar
method was used by Robie (2006) to identify item subtlety. See Table 1 for the
reliabilities, means, and standard deviations of item ratings from this study.
Measures
Personality. The assessment used in archival data was the Work Style 5. The
Work Style 5 is adapted from the NEO-IPIP, and it has 17 items per scale. Data was
collected for each factor: Conscientiousness , Extraversion, Emotional Stability,
Agreeableness, and Openness. Like all of the Work Style 5 scales, Conscientiousness was
highly reliable with a alpha coefficient of 0.87. Next, for Extraversion there was an alpha
coefficient of 0.83. The Emotional Stability alpha was 0.88. For Agreeableness, the alpha
reliability was 0.80. Finally, Openness had a reliability coefficient of 0.85. Examples of
the items and item ratings are presented in Appendix B.
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Lie Scale. The Work Style 5 included a 7-item embedded subscale with Unlikely
Virtues (UV) which was used for some exploratory analyses. The alpha reliability of the
lie scale was 0.61.
Item Ratings. Graduate students had 255 ratings across 85 items of the Work
Style 5, because there were 3 ratings for 17 items each construct. This includes 85 ratings
each for item reliability, verifiability, and job-relevance. The item reliabilities for ratings
across the Big Five were the following: α = 0.88 for verifiability, α = 0.72 for
transparency, and α = 0.87 for job-relevance. Reliabilities were also computed across
raters. Inter-rater reliability is reported in Table 2 for each rating and construct.
Analyses
IRT Estimation. The GRM item and trait level parameters were obtained using
Multilog 7.03 (Thissen, 2003). The fit of the model was evaluated using adjusted chi
square to degrees of freedom ratio (Chernyshenko et al., 2001). I report these statistics for
item singles, pairs, and triples. Ratios below three (adjusted χ2/df < 3.00) indicate
acceptable fit for the 2PL model to the data.
MLR Analyses. The first step of the MLR analyses is to specify an MLR equation
with the IRT estimates of item difficulty (Level 1) and person trait level (Level 2), while
allowing intercepts to vary. I tested for variance in the intercepts using the recommended
chi-squared statistics (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). The intercepts should be explained
completely by trait level estimates so residual variation should be close to zero and
nonsignificant. With nonsignificant intercept variance after controlling for trait level
estimates, the intercept can be specified as fixed. However, if τ 00 is significantly different
from zero, this would indicate differential test functioning (DTF). This means that the
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entire test discriminates on some factor(s) other than trait level. In the unlikely case of
DTF, the intercepts should be allowed to vary for the third and final steps.
The second step evaluates whether or not the slopes of the PRC’s vary across
individuals. In this step, the γ 10 term is the grand mean of person slopes, which is allowed
to vary for individuals’ deviations (u 1j ) in response patterns. If the chi-square test for
slope variance is significant, there are systematic differences in individuals’ PRC slopes.
The third and fourth steps add predictors to explain variance in the intercepts
and/or slopes. These steps tested my hypotheses about faking. Item transparency, jobrelevance, and verifiability will be added as Level 1 predictors. For example, it may be
that transparent items would encourage more faking than subtle items. A positive
correlation for item transparency would indicate less negative slopes for transparent items
than subtle items. Controlling for item difficulty and trait-level estimates, individuals
would be more likely to endorse items that are transparent. Finally, applicant/incumbent
status will be added at Level 2 as a predictor of negative slopes.
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Results
IRT Estimation – Model Fit
I investigated fit of the IRT model and eliminated some items where I could
identify a pattern of misfit. This was necessary where the chi-square to degrees of
freedom statistics were above three (χ2/df > 3.00) for the scales of Agreeableness,
Emotional Stability, and Conscientiousness. At least two scales, Openness and
Extraversion, were allowed to include all of the items with acceptable fit (χ2/df < 3.00).
For the Agreeableness scale, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom
was below three for item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00). It was above four for doubles
(adjusted χ2/df = 4.22) and triples (adjusted χ2/df = 4.31). For one item removed, the
mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio was below three for item singles
(adjusted χ2/df = 0.00). However, it was above three for doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 4.08)
and triples (χ2/df = 3.66). This suggested that the GRM could not reach the accepted
standard of fit for Agreeableness. Thus, Agreeableness was excluded from MLR analysis.
For the Emotional Stability scale, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of
freedom was below three for item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00). It was above four for
doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 4.28) and triples (adjusted χ2/df = 4.66). For two items
removed, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio was below three for
item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00). It was above three for doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 3.30)
and triples (χ2/df = 4.09). Again, this suggested that the GRM exhibited misfit for the
items. Thus, the Emotional Stability scale was excluded from MLR analysis.
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For the Conscientiousness scale, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of
freedom was below three for item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00). It was above three for
doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 3.56) and triples (adjusted χ2/df = 4.32). For one item removed,
the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio was below three for item singles
(adjusted χ2/df = 0.00), item doublets (adjusted χ2/df = 1.98) and triples (χ2/df = 2.04).
This suggested acceptable fit after removing one item for the Conscientiousness scale.
For the Extraversion scale, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom
was below three for item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00), doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 2.54)
and triples (adjusted χ2/df = 2.45). This suggested the GRM fit acceptably well for the
scale of Extraversion.
For the Openness scale, the mean adjusted chi-square to degrees of freedom was
below three for item singles (adjusted χ2/df = 0.00) and doubles (adjusted χ2/df = 2.42). It
was near three for item triples (adjusted χ2/df = 3.42). This suggested reasonable fit for
the scale of Extraversion.
Conscientiousness
Table 3 presents the results for the Conscientiousness scale.
Step 1. As expected for Conscientiousness, trait levels were positively related (γ =
2.70, t (807) = 52.89, p < .01) and thresholds were negatively related (γ = -1.68, t
(12,941) = -27.42, p < .01) to the probability of endorsing the topmost response option
(see Table 3). This indicated that the probability of endorsement decreased along with
trait level, and there was a lower probability of endorsement with increased item
thresholds (i.e., difficulty). The chi-square test showed nonsignificant intercept variance
(χ2 (807) = 780.85, p > .50) for Conscientiousness, which suggested there was no
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systematic variance to be found across persons (i.e., differential test functioning), after
controlling for trait levels and item thresholds.
Step 2. The next step tested for slope variance using chi-square values. The
intercept was fixed but the slope for item difficulty varied. Results indicated significant
slope variance (χ2 (807) = 1,084.62, p < .01), indicating systematic variance in PRC’s.
Step 3. Step 3 tested hypotheses for item-level predictors. I added item
verifiability, transparency, and job relatedness as Level 1 predictors. There was a
nonsignificant but positive relationship between item verifiability and the probability of
item endorsement (γ = 0.08, t (808) = 1.13, p = 0.26), after controlling for the item
thresholds and trait levels. Similarly, a nonsignificant positive relationship between the
probability of item endorsement and item transparency was found (γ = 0.15, t (808) =
0.96, p = 0.34), after controlling for item threshold and trait level. Finally, A
nonsignificant relationship was found between job-relevance and the probability of item
endorsement (γ = 0.02, t (808) = 0.21, p = 0.84). Although two of the relationships were
in the expected direction for item transparency and job-relevance with endorsement, the
positive relationship between item verifiability and endorsement was somewhat
unexpected.
Step 4. In step 4, after controlling for item thresholds, trait levels, and item-level
predictors, applicant/incumbent group was entered as a Level 2 predictor. Incumbents
were coded as 0 and applicants were coded as 1. Contrary to expectations, results showed
that applicant status was negatively related to slopes for Conscientiousness (γ = -0.57, t
(808) = -4.20, p < .01). See Figure 4 for the graph of PRC’s between applicants and
incumbents on Conscientiousness. This graph shows that there is a more negative curve
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for applicants than incumbents, which can contrasted with Figure 2. Applicants were less
likely than incumbents to endorse items that exceeded their estimated trait levels.
Extraversion
Results for the Extraversion scale are presented in Table 4.
Step 1. Trait levels were positively related (γ = 2.33, t (807) = 33.941, p < .01)
and thresholds were negatively related (γ = -1.06, t (12,941) = -27.81, p < .01) to the
probability of endorsing the highest response option. However, the chi-square test for the
intercept variance component had systematic variance (χ2 (807) = 1,172.47, p < .01) that
was not accounted for by either trait level or item thresholds. This indicated that there
was differential test functioning for Extraversion, so the intercepts were allowed to vary
in subsequent steps.
Step 2. In this step, both the intercept and the slope for item difficulty varied.
Results indicated significant intercept variance (χ2 (807) = 1364.43, p < .01) and slope
variance (χ2 (808) = 1229.82, p > .01).
Step 3. In step 3, as expected, item verifiability was related significantly to the
probability of endorsement for Extraversion (γ = -0.24, t (808) = -3.06, p < .01).
Individuals were less likely to endorse items that were more verifiable. In addition, item
transparency was positively related to the probability of endorsement (γ = 0.21, t (808) =
2.91, p < .01). For Extraversion, individuals were more likely to endorse items that were
transparent. Finally, it was surprising there was a significant negative relationship
between job-relevance and the probability of endorsement for Extraversion (γ = -0.25, t
(808) = -3.68, p < .01). The expected relationship would have been positive, because
individuals should have been more likely to endorse the items that are most job-relevant.
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Step 4. There was a nonsignificant difference in item difficulty slopes between
applicants and incumbents for Extraversion (γ = -0.08, t (808) = -1.05, p = .30). See
Figure 5 for the corresponding graph of PRC’s. Because of the variance found in
intercepts, incumbents have a significantly different intercept than applicants. This means
that incumbents had a scoring advantage over applicants regardless of estimated trait
levels.
Openness
Table 5 presents the results for the Openness scale.
Step 1. As expected for Openness, trait levels were positively related (γ =2.61, t
(807) = 51.513, p < .01) and thresholds were negatively related (γ = -0.84, t (12,941) = 21.57, p < .01) to the probability of endorsing the highest response option (see Table 6).
The chi-square test revealed nonsignificant variance in the intercepts (χ2 (807) = 772.78,
p > .50). This indicated the absence of differential test functioning.
Step 2. In Step 2, I fixed the intercept, but allowed the item difficulty slope to
vary. Results suggested significant variance in the slope (χ2 (807) = 1,190.71, p < .01).
Step 3. As expected, item verifiability was negatively related (γ = -0.27, t (808) =
-3.15, p < .01), and item transparency was positively related (γ = 0.33, t (808) = 4.70, p <
.01) to the probability of item endorsement. For Openness, individuals were less likely to
endorse items that had higher verifiability, and individuals were more likely to endorse
items of high transparency. Again, unexpectedly there was a significant negative
relationship between job-relevance and the probability of item endorsement (γ = -0.19, t
(808) = -3.58, p < .01). Thus, individuals were less likely to endorse items that were more
job-relevant for the scale of Openness.
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Step 4. Unexpectedly, applicants had significantly more negative item difficulty
slopes that incumbents (γ = -0.50, t (808) = -4.89, p < .01). See Figure 6 for the
corresponding graph of PRC’s. This graph shows that incumbents have a more positive
slopes than applicants for Openness. The graph is most divergent for items of low
difficulty.
Hypotheses Summary
Hypotheses 1 stated that respondents should be less likely to fake on items that
are more verifiable, because there is the threat to be caught in a lie. Thus, there ought to
be a negative relationship between verifiability and item endorsement. For
Conscientiousness, I found a nonsignificant relationship (γ = 0.08, t (808) = 1.13, p =
0.26) after controlling for the item thresholds and trait levels. As expected, however, item
verifiability was related significantly to the probability of endorsement for Extraversion
(γ = -0.23, t (808) = -3.06, p < .01) and Openness (γ = -0.27, t (808) = -3.15, p < .01).
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 stated that more transparent items should lead to more faking. This
hypothesis would be supported by a positive relationship between item transparency and
the probability of endorsing an item. A nonsignificant positive relationship between slope
and item transparency was found for Conscientiousness (γ = 0.15, t (808) = 0.96, p =
0.34) after controlling for item threshold and trait level. As was expected, item
transparency was positively related to slope for Extraversion (γ = 0.21, t (808) = 2.91, p <
.01) and Openness (γ = 0.33, t (808) = 4.70, p < .01), after controlling for item threshold
and trait level. This indicated that individuals were more likely overall to endorse items
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of high transparency than low transparency, after controlling for item thresholds
(difficulty) and trait levels. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
Hypothesis 3 stated that participants should fake more on behaviors that are seen
as desirable to potential employers. This would be supported if job-relevance is positively
related to the probability of item endorsement. A nonsignificant relationship was found
between job-relevance and slope for Conscientiousness (γ = 0.02, t (808) = 0.21, p =
0.84). Unexpectedly, there was a significant negative relationship between job-relevant
items and endorsement probability for Extraversion (γ = -0.25, t (808) = -3.68, p < .01)
and Openness (γ = -0.19, t (808) = -3.58, p < .01). This showed that individuals were less
likely to endorse items of high job-relevance than low job-relevance, after controlling for
item thresholds (difficulty) and trait levels. Thus, I found no support for Hypothesis 3.
Finally, I believed that applicants should fake more than incumbents as reflected
by Hypothesis 4. Support for Hypothesis 4 would be found if applicants had less negative
slopes than incumbents. Contrary to expectations, results showed that applicants had
more negative related slopes for Conscientiousness (γ = -0.57, t (808) = -4.20, p < .01)
and Openness (γ = -0.50, t (808) = -4.89, p < .01), after controlling for item threshold,
trait levels, item verifiability, item transparency, and item job-relevance. Thus, I found
the opposite of expected results for Hypothesis 4.
Additional Analyses
I conducted an Independent Samples t-test between applicant and incumbent
groups for theta levels. Table 6 shows a t-test comparison of means between incumbents
and applicants. Applicants scored significantly higher than incumbents on
Conscientiousness (t (807) = -9.93, p < .001), Extraversion (t (541.84) = -4.78, p < .001),
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Openness (t (807) = -7.18, p < .001), Emotional Stability (t (807) = -10.78, p < .001), and
Agreeableness (t (807) = -4.72, p < .001). Additionally, the applicant group scored
significantly higher on a lie scale score than incumbents (t (807) = -8.92, p < .001). This
comparison was in support of the overall expectations of applicant-inflated scores.
I also tested for a relationship between lie scale scores and the slopes for item
difficulty. I believed that lie scale scores would be positively related to item-difficulty
slopes, so that increased lie scale scores would lead to increasingly poorer fit. The results
are summarized in Tables 7-9. Lie scale scores were unrelated to slopes for
Conscientiousness (γ = 0.003, t (807) = 0.54, p = .58) or Extraversion (γ = -0.002, t (807)
= -0.75, p = .46), after controlling for item threshold, trait level, item verifiability, item
transparency, and item job-relevance (see Table 7 and 8). Lie scale scores were
negatively related to slopes for Openness (γ = -0.02, t (807) = -3.38, p < .01), after
controlling for item threshold, trait level, and item-level predictors (see Table 9).
Contrary to expectations, lie scale scores were related to increased person fit for one of
three constructs.
Finally, I checked for cross-level interactions between group-level predictors and
those item-level predictors that had significant variance components in Step 3. For
Conscientiousness, there was significant variance in the slopes for item verifiability: (τ2 =
0.53, p < .01), item transparency (τ2 = 0.86, p < .01) and job relatedness (τ2 = 0.69, p <
.01). For Extraversion, I did not find significant variance in slopes for item verifiability
(τ2 = 0.25, p > .05), item transparency (τ2 = 0.11, p > .05), or item job-relevance (τ2 =
0.27, p > .05). Openness had no significant variance components for item verifiability (τ2
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= 0.74, p > .05), item transparency (τ2 = 0.29, p = .42), but there was significant variance
in slopes for item job-relevance (τ2 = 0.30, p = 0.02).
As mentioned earlier in unexpected results, Conscientiousness had a small
positive relationship between item verifiability and the probability of item endorsement.
In the cross-level analysis, applicants had significantly more positive relationships
between item verifiability and the probability of item endorsement for Conscientiousness
(γ = 0.27, t (807) = 2.83, p < .01), after controlling for item thresholds and trait levels
(see Figure 7). This graph shows that applicants were actually more likely to endorse
items of high verifiability than low verifiability, whereas incumbents had almost equal
endorsement across items of low and high verifiability. Lie scale scores did not
significantly affect the relationship between item verifiability and the probability of item
endorsement (γ = 0.00, t (807) = 0.07, p = .943) (see Figure 8), after controlling for item
thresholds and trait levels (see Table 7). Figure 8 shows an almost equal slope between
the upper 75th percentile and the lower 25th percentile of lie scores. Only group
membership (see Figure 7) helped to explain the cross-level relationship between item
verifiability and slopes for Conscientiousness, albeit in an unexpected direction that
showed increased likelihood of endorsement for items high on verifiability.
For item transparency there was a small positive relationship for
Conscientiousness with the probability of item endorsement. Results of the cross-level
interaction suggested that this was smaller for applicants (γ = -0.43, t (807) = -3.08, p <
.01) (see Figure 9). Figure 9 shows that incumbents were significantly more likely to
endorse items of high transparency than low transparency, whereas the endorsement of
applicants remained stable across items of different transparency. Similarly, the upper
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range of lie scale scores was associated with decreases in the size of the relationship
between item transparency and slopes (γ = -0.02, t (807) = -2.52, p < 0.05) (see Figure
10). This graph shows that people who passed the lie test were more likely to endorse
items of high transparency, whereas there was not as much of a relationship between jobrelevance and endorsement for those who failed the lie test.
Incumbents had more of a negative relationships between item job-relevance and
the probability of endorsement (γ = 0.28, t (807) = 3.45, p < 0.01) (see Figure 11), after
controlling for item threshold and trait level. Figure 11 shows that applicants were more
likely to endorse items of high job-relevance than low job-relevance, whereas incumbents
were slightly in the opposite direction. Similarly, higher Lie scale scores were associated
with more positive relationships between item job-relevance and slopes for
Conscientiousness (γ = 0.02, t (807) = 4.33, p < .001) (see Figure 12).
For Openness, incumbents also had more of a negative relationship with item jobrelevance and the probability of endorsement (γ = 0.06, t (807) = 5.98, p < 0.01) (see
Figure 13), after controlling for item threshold and trait level. Figure 13 shows a negative
relationship for incumbents, but almost no effect of job-relevance on endorsement for
applicants. Similarly, low Lie scale scores influenced the relationship between item jobrelevance and endorsement (γ = 0.004, t (807) = 9.17, p < 0.001) (see Figure 14), such
that people who passed the lie test were less likely to endorse job-relevant questions and
more likely to endorse irrelevant items, whereas people who failed the lie test had slightly
opposite relationship with job-relevance and item endorsement.

26

Discussion
MLR IRT analysis has many applications for studying the responses of
examinees. In this study, I was able to examine simultaneously the effects of both item
and person level characteristics on faking, which presented a unique advantage for using
MLR analysis by studying both levels related to faking. Rarely have both levels been
used for a study of test behavior. I found some support for hypotheses and also some
unexpected results that could lead to new directions in research.
Hypotheses
I found some support for Hypothesis 1. Both Extraversion and Openness had
evidence for faking with items that were less verifiable. Items rated with high verifiability
(“I am the first to act,” or, “I can handle a lot of information”) seemed able to curb much
of the faking with these scales. However, these results were not significant for the
Conscientiousness scale.
For Hypothesis 2, I believed that examinees would be more likely to fake on
items that were transparent. The results for Conscientiousness were again nonsignificant.
However, Extraversion and Openness showed that examinees were more likely to fake on
items that were transparent. Transparent items (e.g., “I let myself be pushed around,” or,
“I excel in what I do”) led to the most faking.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that item job-relevance would motivate examinees to fake.
The opposite results were found – that examinees were more likely to fake on items that
were less job-relevant for Extraversion and Openness. Though the results were not
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significant for Conscientiousness, they were in the same unexpected direction. Overall,
this might be because job-irrelevant items carry less of a moral quandary, given that the
perceived importance of the question is low. That is, it would be easier to rationalize
faking on questions that perhaps “unfairly” or “unimportant” test for personal
characteristics outside of the job realm. This may help explain the findings that
individuals were more likely to inflate scores for job-irrelevant items than for jobrelevant items.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that incumbents would have better person fit than
incumbents. I found unexpectedly that applicants had significantly better person fit than
incumbents for both Conscientiousness and Openness scales. A potential explanation for
this is there may differences in response processes used. For example, the GRM used in
the present study assumed a dominance response process where the probability of item
endorsement relates monotonically to individuals’ trait levels. With the dominance
response model, individuals’ probability of endorsing the item, “I try to follow rules,”
increases as their conscientiousness increases.
However, other response processes than the dominance model have been
theorized. Chernyshenko, Stark, Drasgow, and Roberts (2007) and Stark, Chernyshenko,
Drasgow, and Williams (2006) have recently suggested that ideal point models should be
considered for personality measures. These models suggest that individuals judge how
well an item describes them in terms of the underlying trait and tend to endorse items that
they feel match their level of the trait. They will tend to endorse items that they feel
match their trait levels. The mismatch may be because they believe their trait level is less
than or exceeds that indicated by the item. The former is termed disagreeing from below
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and the latter is labeled disagreeing from above. For example, individuals may not
endorse the “I try to follow rules” item because they hardly ever try to follow rules or
because they always follow rules. This type of disagreement causes a bell-shaped IRF.
The decrease in the probability of endorsement associated with disagreeing from above is
referred to as folding.
It may be that applicants use a dominance response process, and incumbents use
an ideal point response process because of the differences in testing situations. If this
were the case, the 2PLM would fit better for applicants than incumbents because
applicants’ response would be consistent with the model, while incumbents would be
inconsistent with the monotonic assumptions of the model. That is, PRC’s indicate how
well the IRT model fits for individuals. My results indicate that the 2PLM fits
significantly better for applicants than incumbents.
Additional Analyses
This study conducted additional analyses to check the hypothesis of faking
against the finding that applicant PRC’s fit better than incumbents to the 2PLM. It was
verified that applicants had a significantly higher lie scale score and higher estimated trait
levels than incumbents on all Big Five measures (see Table 6). That is, applicants scored
approximately 0.4 to 0.6 standard deviations higher than incumbents on estimated trait
levels. The magnitude of this difference is supported by prior research on the prevalence
of faking for applicants and incumbents (Robie et al., 2001; Zickar & Robie, 1991).
For both Conscientiousness and Openness, the relationship between item jobrelevance and endorsement was more negative for incumbents, and it appeared to be
somewhat of a positive relationship for applicants (see Figures 11 and 13).The incumbent
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curves show lower rates of endorsement as item job-relevance increased. Perhaps this
was part of the reason for incumbents to have more positive PRC’s than applicants,
because incumbents appeared more cautious at endorsing some items than others if
questions were high on job-relevance. The slightly positive rates of endorsement for
applicants would have been expected due to faking.
For Conscientiousness, the relationship between item verifiability and
endorsement was stronger for applicants (see Figure 7). Although incumbents had equal
endorsement for items of low and high verifiability, applicants had more positive rates of
endorsement for items that were increasingly verifiable. It may be that applicants thought
that verifiable items were more appealing to a prospective employer, and thus, they may
have weighted the importance of these items in their responses. Item verifiability seemed
important to applicant responses, but it is apparent less so for incumbents.
In contrast, incumbents placed greater weight on item transparency. That is,
transparent items tended to have positive rates of endorsement for incumbents, which
strengthened the relationship between item transparency and endorsement (see Figure 9).
Although the applicant curve shows no relationship between transparency and
endorsement, the characteristic of item transparency seemed important to the responses of
incumbents whose response process might have been influenced by relatedness of items
to the construct.
It is interesting to speculate on the overall pattern of the cross-level interactions. It
appears that applicants were placing greater weight on item characteristics that could be
viewed as favorable by the organization. That is, the more job-relevant and verifiable the
items were, then the more likely applicants would endorse them. It is possible that
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applicants believed items with these characteristics were the ones on which organizations
placed the most weight. In contrast, these item characteristics did not appear to matter for
incumbents.
The reverse was true for item transparency which mattered more for incumbents,
but not as much for applicants. It may be that applicants did not place importance on item
transparency because they believed that the organization did not place a lot of weight on
transparent items.
Limitations
One of the possible limitations is that the study used only a single profession from
which to draw personality scores. Multiple vocations would add much towards the
generalization of results. There are also prior findings that applicants are better able to
fake for some professions than others (e.g., Mahar et al., 1995, Martin et al., 2002,
Birkeland et al., 2006). Different jobs will have different requirements, so item jobrelevance is likely to vary. Data from other jobs would have been useful for additional
analyses of item- and group-level relationships with faking.
Furthermore, the present study was limited to a between subjects design for
applicants and incumbents. The tests for variance may have been constricted by possible
between-group differences that could have been unrelated to the present model of faking.
For instance, the group of incumbents could have had personality standings that matched
for the job from attraction, selection, and attrition (see Schneider et al., 1995). If
incumbents had a limited range for Conscientiousness – due to its relationship to overall
job performance and attrition – this would help to explain the lack of significance in the
present study using incumbents as a comparison group. A future study can have more
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power statistically, for example, by testing and retesting a group of candidates who are
hired to the position.
Also, graduate students’ ratings of job-relevance may have differed from the
examinees’ actual impressions of job-relevance. Applicants and incumbents may have
different ratings job-relevance, depending on their knowledge of job characteristics. The
present study was restricted to graduate student ratings of item job-relevance.
Finally, there was no way to check for demographic variables in the current study,
because it was based on data that was already collected from a customer call center.
Demographic characteristics may have explained the differential test functioning for
Extraversion, or some person level characteristics could have been added to the model for
prediction of faking. Characteristics such as age, test experience, and gender would be
useful for a study of faking.
Future Research
MLR and the 2PL model may provide insight into test answers and item
characteristics, as well as person characteristics. The factors that contribute to faking are
relatively unexplored in the domain of personality testing. Future research should
investigate different professions and uses the same ratings of item characteristics. The
same results should be duplicated for other personality inventories than the Work Style 5.
I believe that further research using MLR IRT methods would help provide a better
model of faking, and it also would provide support in understanding the vagaries of this
complicated technique.
Future research should include additional self-ratings (e.g., job experience,
attitudes, or testing experience), which might explore the many possible contributors to
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faking. A confidential survey could provide answers to many questions regarding the
prevalence and attitudes toward response distortion. For example, a set of questions could
ask for conditions where people have lied in their past, conditions where lying is socially
acceptable, and reactions toward dishonest behaviors. I believe that questions related to
lying are rarely asked in an experimental situation where people are encouraged to be
honest about their responses. Furthermore, demographics and attitudes can help to
identify the roots of differential test functioning.
An experimental study could go toward confirming the effect of the ideal point
response model or dominance model on fit. Controlled conditions can be instructed to
endorse questions for the ideal point model instructions: “If the question fits you exactly
in your everyday behavior,” and as for the dominance model instructions: “If the question
would be scored equal or below your trait level.” Another type of study that could be
useful is a statistical simulation that answers some questions in a monotonic fashion and
another set of questions in a non-monotonic fashion, and then the results of MLR IRT
analyses could be compared. The results of these experiments could be referenced back to
the present study of faking.
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Appendix A

Rated each question of the NEO-IPIP on the following scales:
Verifiability –
1 = unverifiable … the question is subjective and relates to innermost attitudes.
2 = slightly verifiable … the question is borderline subjective and relates to internal
attitudes.
3 = somewhat verifiable … the question is borderline objective and relates to external
behaviors.
4 = highly verifiable … the question is objective and can be easily corroborated.
Transparency –
1 = very obvious … the question clearly fits in with the other questions of the construct.
2 = somewhat obvious … the question somewhat fits in with other questions of the
construct.
3 = somewhat subtle … the question is somewhat different from other questions of the
construct.
4 = very subtle … the question does not fit in clearly with other questions of the
construct.
Job-Relevance –
1 = not job-related … the question is not related to performance of job duties.
2 = slightly job-related … the question could conceivably be related to slight aspects of
job performance.
3 = somewhat job-related … the question is related to performance of supplemental
behaviors on the job.
4 = very job-related … the question is highly related to performance of actual job duties.
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Appendix B

_____________________________________________________________________
Mean Item Ratings (min 1, max 4):
Verifiability
Transparency
Sample Item from the Work Style 5:
Job-Relevance
_____________________________________________________________________
“Finish what I start.”
(Conscientiousness)

3.72

1.36

3.91

“Do a lot in my spare time.”
(Extraversion)

3.09

2.45

1.64

“Keep my cool.”
(Emotional Stability)

2.63

1.45

3.09

“Am concerned about others.”
(Agreeableness)

2.27

1.73

2.27

“Adapt well to new situations.”
2.82
1.54
3.00
(Openness)
_____________________________________________________________________
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Figure 1. Example of Item Response Curves
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Figure 2. Example of Person Response Curves
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1.38

Figure 3. Example of BRF’s
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Figure 4. Graph of PRC’s for Conscientiousness
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Figure 5. Graph of PRC’s for Extraversion
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Figure 6. Graph of PRC’s for Openness
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Figure 7. Interaction between group membership and item verifiability for
Conscientiousness

51

Probability of Endorsement

1.00

Lie score = 40.69
Lie score = 54.77

0.75

0.50

0.25

0
-1.02

-0.56

-0.11

0.35

0.80

Item Verifiability

Figure 8. Interaction between lie scale score and item verifiability for Conscientiousness
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Figure 9. Interaction between group membership and item transparency for
Conscientiousness
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Figure 10. Interaction between lie scale score and item transparency for
Conscientiousness
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Figure 11. Interaction between group membership and item job-relevance for
Conscientiousness
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Figure 12. Interaction between lie scale score and item job-relevance for
Conscientiousness
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Figure 13. Interaction between group membership and item job-relevance for Openness
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Figure 14. Interaction between lie scale score and item job-relevance for Openness
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Table 1.
Descriptive Ratings for Items
___________________________________________________________________
Measure
Alpha
M
S.D.
___________________________________________________________________
Item Verifiability:
Work Style 5

0.88

2.50

0.65

85

Conscientiousness

0.73

2.98

0.51

17

Extraversion

0.82

2.78

0.76

17

Agreeableness

0.87

2.18

0.72

17

Emotional Stability

0.93

2.10

0.67

17

Openness

0.82

2.44

0.60

17

Item Transparency:
Work Style 5

0.72

1.99

0.75

85

Conscientiousness

0.78

1.78

0.62

17

Extraversion

0.77

1.92

0.72

17

Agreeableness

0.56

2.08

0.76

17

Emotional Stability

0.75

1.98

0.80

17

Openness

0.50

2.16

0.85

17

Item Job-Relevance:
Work Style 5

0.87

2.63

0.72

85

Conscientiousness

0.59

3.16

0.45

17

Extraversion

0.84

2.35

0.83

17

59

Agreeableness

0.90

2.51

0.90

17

Emotional Stability

0.83

2.53

0.88

17

Openness
0.81
2.62
0.81
17
______________________________________________________________________
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Table 2.
Reliabilities, Means, and Standard Deviations for Inter-Rater Agreement (n = 11)
______________________________________________________________________
Measure
Alpha
Mean
S.D.
Items
______________________________________________________________________
Inter-Rater Agreement:
Work Style 5

0.86

2.37

0.64

255

Item Verifiability

0.88

2.50

0.63

85

Item Transparency

0.72

1.98

0.47

85

Item Job-Relevance

0.87

2.63

0.66

85

Conscientiousness

0.92

2.64

0.81

51

Extraversion

0.83

2.35

0.62

51

Agreeableness

0.77

2.25

0.52

51

Emotional Stability

0.78

2.20

0.54

51

Openness
0.87
2.41
0.66
51
______________________________________________________________________
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Table 3.
Results from the MLR analyses for Conscientiousness Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

γ

SE

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

-1.68 *

.06

-1.67*

.07

-1.64*

.08

-1.26*

.12

Verifiability

0.08

.07

0.08

.07

Transparency

0.15

.16

0.15

.16

Job-Relevance

0.02

.08

0.02

.08

Item-level
Threshold

Person-level
Intercept

-4.51*

.08

-4.50*

.08

-4.54*

.08

-4.44*

.08

Trait Level

2.70*

.05

2.69*

.05

2.71*

.05

2.77*

.05

-0.28*

.05

Difficulty by Group

-0.57*

.14

Verifiability by Group

0.27*

.09

Transparency by Group

-0.43*

.14

Job-Relevance by Group

0.28*

.08

Group
Cross-level interactions

Variance components
Intercept

.00

Item difficulty slope

.46*

Verifiability slope

62

1.00*

.99*

.53*

.54*

Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.

63

.86*
.21

.90*
.52*

.69*

.72*

Table 4.
Results from the MLR analyses for Extraversion Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

Γ

SE

-1.06*

.04

-1.06*

.04

-1.12*

.04

-1.08*

.06

Verifiability

-0.24*

.08

-0.23*

.08

Transparency

0.21*

.07

0.21*

.07

Job-Relevance

-0.25*

.07

-0.25*

.07

Item-level
Threshold

Person-level
Intercept

-3.67*

.07

-3.67*

.07

-3.74*

.06

-3.52*

.08

Trait Level

2.33*

.07

2.34*

.07

2.42*

.07

2.44*

.07

-0.36*

.08

-0.08

.08

Group
Cross-level interactions
Difficulty by Group
Verifiability by Group

N/A

Transparency by Group

N/A

Job-Relevance by Group

N/A

Variance components
Intercept

.19*

Item difficulty slope
Verifiability slope
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.12*

.10*

.11*

.09*

.08*

.07*

.24

.25

Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.
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.11
.21

.11
.52*

.27

.29

Table 5.
Results from the MLR analyses for Openness Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

Γ

SE

-0.84*

.04

-0.87*

.05

-1.15*

.06

-0.85*

.09

-0.27*

.09

-0.28*

.09

Transparency

0.33*

.07

0.32*

.07

Job-Relevance

-0.19* .05

-0.20*

.05

Item-level
Threshold
Verifiability

Person-level
Intercept

-4.24*

.07

-4.28*

.07

-4.38*

.07

-4.25*

.08

Trait Level

2.61*

.05

2.63*

.05

2.69*

.05

2.74*

.05

-0.28*

.05

-0.50*

.10

Group
Cross-level interactions
Difficulty by Group
Verifiability by Group

N/A

Transparency by Group

N/A

Job-Relevance by Group

0.06*

Variance components
Intercept

.00

Item difficulty slope

.55*

Verifiability slope
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.21

.23

.74

.73

.01

Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.
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.39
.21

.29
.52*

.30*

.30

Table 6.
Differences between Incumbent and Applicant Groups on Theta Scores and Lie scale
scores
___________________________________________________________________
Incumbents (n=302) Applicants (n=507)
Measure
M
SD
M
SD
t
df
___________________________________________________________________
Conscientiousness

1.01

.61

1.47

.63

-9.93*

807

Extraversion

0.34

.58

0.53

.48

-4.78*

541.84**

Openness

0.91

.61

1.21

.57

-7.18*

807

Emotional Stability

0.62

.59

1.08

.56

-10.78*

807

Agreeableness

1.38

.58

1.60

.60

-4.72*

807

Lie scale score
43.66 10.89
50.39 10.08
-8.92*
807
___________________________________________________________________
*p < .001.
**Equal variances not assumed for t-test.
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Table 7.
Results from the lie score MLR analyses for Conscientiousness Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4.5

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

Γ

SE

-1.68 *

.06

-1.67*

.07

-1.64*

.08

-1.81*

.32

Verifiability

0.08

.07

0.08

.07

Transparency

0.15

.16

0.15

.16

Job-Relevance

0.02

.08

0.02

.08

Item-level
Threshold

Person-level
Intercept

-4.51*

.08

-4.50*

.08

-4.54*

.08

-4.40*

.12

Trait Level

2.70*

.05

2.69*

.05

2.71*

.05

2.75*

.06

Lie scale score

-0.00

.00

Difficulty by Lie scale score

0.00

.01

Verifiability by Lie scale

0.00

.00

-0.02*

.01

0.02*

.00

Cross-level interactions

score
Transparency by Lie scale
score
Job-Relevance by Lie scale
score
Variance components
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Intercept

.00

Item difficulty slope

.46*

Verifiability slope
Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.

70

1.00*

.98*

.53*

.52*

.86*
.21

.86*
.52*

.69*

.68*

Table 8.
Results from the lie scoreMLR analyses for Extraversion Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4.5

γ

SE

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

-1.06*

.04

-1.06*

.04

-1.12*

.04

-0.98*

.19

Verifiability

-0.24*

.08

-0.25*

.08

Transparency

0.21*

.07

0.21*

.07

Job-Relevance

-0.25*

.07

-0.25*

.07

Item-level
Threshold

Person-level
Intercept

-3.67*

.07

-3.67*

.07

-3.74*

.06

-4.34*

.18

Trait Level

2.33*

.07

2.34*

.07

2.42*

.07

2.31*

.07

0.01*

.00

-0.00

.00

Lie scale score
Cross-level interactions
Difficulty by Lie scale score
Verifiability by Lie scale

N/A

score
Transparency by Lie scale

N/A

score
Job-Relevance by Lie scale

N/A

score
Variance components
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Intercept

.19*

Item difficulty slope

.12*

.10*

.08*

.09*

.08*

.09*

.24

.24

.11
.21

.11
.52*

.27

.28

Verifiability slope
Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.
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Table 9.
Results from the lie score MLR analyses for Openness Response Option 5
Probability of endorsement
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4.5

γ

SE

γ

SE

γ

SE

Γ

SE

-0.84*

.04

-0.87*

.05

-1.15*

.06

-0.38

.24

-0.27*

.09

-0.26*

.09

Transparency

0.33*

.07

0.33*

.07

Job-Relevance

-0.19* .05

-0.19*

.05

Item-level
Threshold
Verifiability

Person-level
Intercept

-4.24*

.07

-4.28*

.07

-4.38*

.07

-4.18*

.12

Trait Level

2.61*

.05

2.63*

.05

2.69*

.05

2.73*

.06

Lie scale score

-0.00

.00

-0.02*

.00

Cross-level interactions
Difficulty by Lie scale score
Verifiability by Lie scale

N/A

score
Transparency by Lie scale

N/A

score
Job-Relevance by Lie scale

0.00*

score
Variance components

73

.00

Intercept

.00

Item difficulty slope

.55*

Verifiability slope
Transparency slope

.26*

Job-Relevance slope
Note. * p < .05.
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.21

.25

.74

.71

.39
.21

.30
.52*

.30*

.30*

